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Untangling the World Wide Web: Restricting
Children's Access to Adult Materials While
Preserving the Freedoms of Adults
INTRODUCION

Currently, some view the Internet as a fountainhead for anarchy, beyond
the control of state or federal government. They view it as a wild frontier, and
like the Wild West of early America, they seek to conquer and tame it before
lawlessness abounds. Responding to these views, The United States Congress
has already twice passed legislation in an attempt to restrict children's access
to the indecent material on the Internet.' State legislatures have attempted to

pass similar restrictions.2 The federal laws have encountered First
In addition to First
Amendment 3 difficulties when reviewed in court.'
run into Commerce
have
area
this
in
Amendment difficulties, state statutes
6
5
Clause problems as well. Reasons given by the courts for these statutes'
conflicts with the First Amendment are several, including vagueness,
overbreadth, and failure to pass strict scrutiny.7

1. See Telecommunications Act 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), 223(d) (West 1996 & Supp.
2000). May be cited as "Communications Decency Act of 1996." [hereinafter CDA]; Child
Online Protection Act 47 U.S.C.A. § 230-231 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter COPA].
2. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(a) (Michie 1998); 1999 Public Act 33
Amendments, M.C.L. 722.671 et seq. (1978).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in
part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of people peaceably to assemble.. ." id.
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter Reno 1](striking down two
provisions of the Communications Decency Act for violating the First Amendment); ACLU v.
Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) [hereinafter Reno Il(granting preliminary injunction
against enforcement of Child Online Protection Act on likelihood that it will be found
unconstitutional); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Reno III] (affirming
preliminary injunction granted in Reno 11).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
states that "Congress shall have power... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States.. ." Id
6. See ACLUv. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (striking downstate internet
regulations, in part, because of conflict with the Commerce Clause); see also Cyberspace v.
Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999). But see People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2000) (holding that the effect on interstate commerce is incidental and
outweighed by the state's interest in preventing harm to minors with indecent material sent to
a known minor).
217 F.3d 162.
7. See Reno 1,521 U.S. 844; Reno 11, 31 F. Supp 2d 473; Reno I11,
Under the First Amendment's strict scrutiny standard of review, a law that restricts the content
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The first major U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with freedom of speech

and the restriction of children's access to adult materials on the Internet was
the landmark case of Reno v. ACLU,' (Reno 1) where the high Court struck
down two provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 9 as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 0 In
response to the Court's decision in Reno I, Congress passed the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA)," which it hoped would cure the constitutional
deficiencies of the CDA.'2 The American Civil Liberties Union, along with
several others, 3 immediately challenged the constitutionality of COPA, and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also found this latest effort by
Congress unconstitutional under the First Amendment. t Many scholars feel
that any criminal law like COPA will be found unconstitutional." In fact, the
Third Circuit Court reviewing COPA itself suggested that any such criminal
statute may run into First Amendment difficulties under the current state of
computer technology.' 6 Yet, if the criminal statutes enacted so far are not the
answer to the problem of free access by children to pornographic material,

of speech will only be upheld if it is reasonably necessary to serve a compelling government
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that government interest. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455,461 (1980), cited in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983).
8. 521 U.S. 844.
9. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), 223(d) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
10. Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844.
11. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230-231 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
12. Peter Jacobson, The ChildOnline ProtectionAct: Taming the World "Wild" Web,
9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 421 (1999).
13. Other plaintiffs included: Androgyny Books, Inc.; American Booksellers

Foundation for Free Expression, Inc.; Artnet Worldwide Corporation; Blackstripe; Addazi, Inc.;

Electronic Frontier Foundation; Electronic Privacy Information Center; Free Speech Media;
Internet Content Coalition; Obgyn.net; Philadelphia Gay News; Powell's Bookstore; Riotgrri;
Salon Internet, Inc.; and West Stock, Inc. Reno 111, 217 F.3d at 162.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Kelly M. Doherty, WWW Obscenity.Com: An Analysis of Obscenityand
Indecency Regulationon the Internet,32 AKRON L REv. 259 (1999); Jacobson, supranote 12;
Timothy Zick, Congress,the Internet, and the IntractablePornographyProblem: The Child
Online ProtectionAct of 1998, 32 CREIGrrON L. REv. 1147 (1999).
16. See Reno II,217 F.3d at 166.
In affirming the District Court, we are forced to recognize that. at present,
due to technological limitatiQns, there may be no other means by which
harmful material on the Web may be constitutionally restricted, although,
in light of rapidly developing technological advances, what may now be
impossible to regulate constitutionally may, in the not-to-distant future,
become feasible.
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then what are the alternatives? More generally, what is the future of laws
attempting to regulate adult material on the Internet?
This comment attempts to shed some light on these questions by
examining the current state of the law in the area of internet regulation
restricting children's access to adult material. This area of law is very new,
with the majority of case precedent developed over just the last five or six
years. Although the term "Internet" applies to various aspects of cyberspace
including the World Wide Web, e-mail, chat rooms, listserves, newsgroups,
"
FTP's, and other interactive environments, ' this essay will focus mainly on
the area of the World Wide Web. Part I of this comment provides a brief
overview of the U.S. Supreme Court precedent relating to freedom of speech
and various forms of media. Part H gives a description of the history,
terminology, and characteristics of the World Wide Web. Part I gives a brief
analysis of the CDA and the Reno I case. Part IV briefly discusses COPA and
the Reno Hl and III cases. Part V analyzes four other early landmark cases
involving government regulation of adult material on the Web. It also predicts
the resolution in court of a COPA-like law under reliable geographic and ageverification technology, based on the current state of law derived from these
four cases and the Reno decisions. It also discusses other possible future
trends in this area of law through a critique of three other law review articles

on this topic. Part VI will examine some alternatives to criminal statutes that
may limit children's access to adult websites. Part VII concludes that future
criminal laws like COPA will most likely not withstand First Amendment
scrutiny, and that future attempts at governmental regulation of adult websites
via criminal statutes will probably prove equally unsuccessful, at least until

technology advances enough to allow for reasonable precision in restricting
children's access while not stifling adults' freedom of speech on the Web.

I. OVERVIEW OF U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Before exploring the world of internet regulation, this comment will
begin by briefly examining how the U.S. Supreme Court has viewed First
Amendment protections of adult material in other forms of media including
magazines, mail brochures, radio, adult theaters, telephone, and cable
television communications. A brief overview of the following cases provides
a background into the Supreme Court's treatment of First Amendment

protections and these forms of media.

17.

SeeRenol 521 U.S. at851.
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A. GINSBERG V. NEW YORK"8

The Supreme Court ruled that a state statute that prohibited the sale of
material "harmful to minors"' 9 did not infringe upon minors' constitutional
freedom of expression and that the statute's definition of "harmful to minors"
was not unconstitutionally vague.' The Court found that a state may prohibit
the distribution of sexually-explicit materials to children, even if those
materials would not be considered obscene to adults.'
B. MILLER V. CALIFORNIA 22

The Court held that obscenity is not a constitutionally protected class of
speech. z In determining whether matter is obscene, state courts should ask
whether:
1) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appealed to the prurient interest; 2) the work depicted or
described, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 3) the
work, taken as a whole, lacked serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.24
In order to meet the requirement of finding material obscene, the state law
must specifically define the sexual conduct or description that is prohibited so
as to provide fair notice as to what is prohibited.' The Miller Court ruled that

18. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Defendant Ginsberg was convicted of violating a statute that
prohibited the knowing sale of sexually explicit magazines to an individual under seventeen
years of age. Id.

19. The statute defined "harmful to minors" as material that "appeals to the prurient
interest of minors," is "patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors," and is "utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors." Id. at 633.
20. Id. at 643-45. A statutory definition is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives
adequate notice of what is prohibited. Id.
21. Id. at 636-37.
22. 413 U.S. 15(1973). Miller was convicted for mailing unsolicited brochures, which
contained pictures of explicit sexual acts in violation of a California statute making it a crime
to knowingly distribute obscene material. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 24. A "prurient interest" is a shameful or morbid interest in sex, nudity, or
excretion. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
25.

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community
standards," not a "national standard."2'
C. FCC V. PACIFICA FOUNDATION

27

The United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) had the authority to impose sanctions on licensees who
broadcast indecent material during hours in which children are likely to be a
part of the audience.8 The Court found that such a restriction was not
overbroad and the fact that the broadcast was not obscene did not prevent the
FCC from prohibiting the broadcast when children were likely to be in the
3
audience.29 Thus, the FCC could properly take context into account. While
such indecent words would have a certain amount of First Amendment
protection, the fact that indecent words were broadcast over radio at an early
hour made the message accessible to children in the privacy of one's own
home.3" Since broadcast radio is a "pervasive" medium, greater prohibition of
speech than would normally be the case for indecent, as opposed to obscene,
material is allowable.32 Radio has also traditionally been a heavily-regulated
medium by the FCC. Such heavy33 regulation is justified because of the
"scarcity" of the broadcast medium.
34

D. NEW YORK V. FERBER

The U. S. Supreme Court ruled that, like obscenity, child pornography is
unprotected by the First Amendment if it includes a visual depiction of sexual
conduct by children without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific

26. Id at 30.

27. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The FCC held the owner of a radio station could be subject
to administrative sanctions under 56 FCC 2d 94 for airing a monologue by comedian George
Carlin in which Carlin uses the "seven words that you can never say on the public airwaves"
during the early afternoon hours. Id.
28. See id.
29. See idat 746.
30. Id. at 747-48.
31. Id. at 746-49.
32. Id. at 748. Radio is a "pervasive" medium in that it enters the home of the listener
without warning of the content.
33. Id. at 731 n.2. The broadcast medium is "scarce" because traditional broadcast
receivers can only receive a limited number of transmissions in one area. If too many signals
are broadcast in a single area, the signals will "interfere" with each other.
34. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The defendant was the owner of a bookstore and was
convicted for selling films, which contained images of young boys masturbating, in violation
of a state statute that proscribed the knowing promotion of sexual performances by children
under the age of sixteen. Id.
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value. s Child pornography is not constitutionally protected even if it is not
obscene because of a compelling state interest in protecting children and

preventing sexual exploitation and abuse of children.36
E. RENTON V. PLAYTIME THEATERS

37

The United States Supreme Court held that a city zoning ordinance which
prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residence,
church, park, or school was a content-neutral restriction on speech, and that as
a time, manner, and place restriction, the ordinance was not analyzed under the

same strict scrutiny afforded to restrictions on the content of speech.3" The
Court also found that the ordinance served a substantial governmental interest
in curtailing the "secondary effects" of such adult establishments, such as

potential increases in crime in the surrounding neighborhood. 3 The majority
felt that the ordinance allowed for reasonable alternative means of communication outside of the zoned area. 4' The Court ruled that the city's ordinance was
constitutional despite the fact that the individuals of the community would
have to pay to enter the privacy of the establishment before they would be able
to view any sexually-explicit material.4 '
42

F. SABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF CAL, INC. V. FCC

The United States Supreme Court found that a. total ban on obscene,
interstate, commercial telephone communications did not violate the First
Amendment because First Amendment protection does not extend to obscene
speech.4 3 The majority felt that it did not matter that distributors of obscene
telephone communications might be subjected to varying community standards
in different federal districts in determining the obscenity of the material." The
Court, however, did find the total ban on indecent telephone communications
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, because of the denial of adult

35.

36.
37.

Id. at 764.
Id at 760-61.

475 U.S. 41 (1986).

38. Id. at 48-49.
39. Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 52.
41. See id.
42. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Sable Communications, a company that offered sexuallyoriented prerecorded telephone messages to customers who dialed into the company, challenged
FCC prohibitions against indecent and obscene telephone messages. Id.
43. Id. at 124.
44. Id. at 124-25.
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access to these telephone messages.4". Unlike the Pacifica case, which
prohibited indecent broadcasts over radio, the receipt of indecent telephone
communications requires "affirmative steps" on the part of the listener as
opposed to the "pervasive" nature of the radio.' Since telephone communications are not a pervasive medium in the way broadcast radio is, the Court
found that the total ban was not the least restrictive means of serving the
government interest of protecting minors from indecent phone communications so as to satisfy strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.4'
G. DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONSCONSORTUM

V. FCC48

Three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 were challenged."9 The Court found that no rigid
judicial formulas can be applied to all media." ' A provision permitting cable
operators to prohibit patently offensive, sexual material on leased channels
was deemed constitutional because editorial speech is protected and the leased
channels on cable are similar to broadcast radio in Pacifica, even though the
viewer must first subscribe to cable.5" A provision that required cable
operators to segregate patently offensive, sexual material to separate leased
channels was found unconstitutional because less restrictive alternatives like
lockboxes existed, and thus the provision did not survive the strict scrutiny of
First Amendment review." A provision allowing cable operators to prohibit
patently offensive, sexual materials from public access channels was also
found unconstitutional because municipal supervisory control was more
appropriate and less restrictive."3

45. Id. at 131.
46. Id. at 127-28.
47. Id. at 128.
48. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
49. See id. The first provision allowed cable operators to ban indecent programming
on leased channels. The second provision required cable operators to segregate indecent
programming onto a single channel and block that channel unless the subscriber requested
access to the channel in writing. The third provision allowed cable operators to prohibit
indecent programming on public access channels. Id.
50. Id. at 741-42.
51. Id. at 743.
52. Id. at 760.
53. Id. at 766.
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1I. WORLD WIDE WEB
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB

Before any discussion can begin about the state of the law relating to
government regulation of the World Wide Web, not only is an understanding
of speech and media case precedent important, but an understanding of the
history, technology, usage, vocabulary, and characteristics of the Web is also
necessary. The World Wide Web is part of the category known as the
"Internet." 4 The use of the Internet proliferated in the early 1990's and is now
used as a means of communication by millions of people throughout the
world."5 People can gain access to the Internet from a variety of sources
usually via commercial hosts or universities.' These commercial and noncommercial hosts are referred to as "Internet Service Providers" or "ISP's" and
offer modem or cable access to a computer network linked to the Internet.5
Individuals can gain access to the Internet through ISP's for a relatively small
fee or sometimes for free as a benefit of work, college, or group affiliation."
Once these individuals have access to an internet account, they can access
the World Wide Web through the use of a "web browser" which allows them
to "surf" various websites published by others.59 With the use of a browser
such as "Netscape" or "Internet Explorer," individuals may view text, photos,
video, and audio from these various websites' Each web page has its own
specific address, and contains a hypertext transfer protocol, or "http."' " A web
surfer may either type in a known web address directly or use a "search
engine" to enter keywords.' 2 The search engine will then give the user a list
of sites, and direct links to those sites, which contain the keywords entered by
the web surfer. 3 The Web also uses a formatting language called hypertext
markup language, or "HTML," which allows the browsers to interpret and

54. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 849-50. The Internet is an international network of
interconnected computers that began as a military program called "ARPANET" in 1969, and
which later led to the rapid development of civilian networks. Id.
55. Zick, supra note 15, at 1155. "While estimates are difficult to confirm, the Internet
is currently believed to connect more than 159 countries and over 100 million users." Id.
56. Reno l, 521 U.S. at 850.
57. Reno 1l, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482. A modem is a piece of computer hardware that
allows a user to access the Internet via a telephone line.
58. Id.
59. Zick, supra note 15, at 1155.
60. Id.
61. Id. The hypertext transfer protocol is the standard web formatting language. Id.
62. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 852. Yahoo, Altavista, Webcrawler, and Lycos are examples
of such search engines. Reno 1I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
63.

Reno l, 521 U.S. at 852.

2001]

UNTANGLING THE WORLD WIDE WEB

display the information presented on the page." Websites usually contain
"links" which allow the web surfer to access other sites directly from the site
they are already viewing. 5 Most websites are freely accessible to a web
surfer, but some require a password or credit card number in order to proceed
to the site or certain pages within the site." Most websites offer at least some
free content as a way of creating greater "traffic" to the site.' 7 Adult sites often
generate traffic to their sites by offering "teasers."" These teasers are
generally free, sexually-explicit images.'" The web surfer is then offered
similar images if they pay for access to the rest of the site.'0
Although publishing a website is somewhat more complicated than
surfing the Web, any group or individual may publish a site on the World
Wide Web.7 ' People are also generally free to publish sexually-explicit
websites as well, subject to the administrative regulations of their internet
provider. These sites are created, posted, and accessed in the same manner as
sites that contain no sexual material.72 Individuals may receive webspace for
the publication of a web page by paying a commercial provider. Webspace is
also available for free through various providers like universities or companies
such as Yahoo GeoCities, Xoom, and Angelfire which require webmasters to
place the provider's advertisements on any page published on its webspace."
Information available on the Web is often created, maintained, and
controlled by one individual, and is located on separate computers found all
over the world. 4 At the time of the Reno 11 case, it was estimated that "60%
of all content originates in the United States and 40% originates outside the
5
The use of links on various web pages has created a very
United States.""1
interconnected, though decentralized, environment on the Web. Indeed, a
recent study suggests that any one, randomly-picked web page which features
64.

Reno I,31 F. Supp. 2d at 483.

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

71.

Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 853. "No single organization controls any membership in the

72.
73.

Id.
See, e.g., Yahoo! GeoCities, at http://geocities.yahoo.com/home/ (last visited Jan.

74.
75.

Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 853.
Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484.

65. Id. Navigating the Web via links is physically accomplished through using a
computer mouse to direct an onscreen pointer and then by the user "clicking" the mouse button
in order to follow that link to the next site. Reno 1,521 U.S. at 852.
66. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 852-53.
67. Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487. 'Traffic" refers to the number of visitors to a
particular website within a certain time.

70.

Id.

Web, nor is there any centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be
blocked from the Web." Id.
8, 2000).
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links to other websites which, in turn, have their own links to yet more such
websites, is only nineteen clicks of a mouse away from any other such site. 76
Thus, theoretically, a child browsing a children's website which features links
to other sites is only nineteen clicks of a mouse away from any particular adult
site with links.
After information is published on the Web, the publisher, also called a
"webmaster," has no way of preventing the information on that website from
being viewed by a particular person or community.' Thus, once published,
a webmaster can reach a potentially worldwide audience. 78 No effective way
of determining the age or identity of those who are accessing the information
yet exists because visitors to websites remain anonymous." In addition, web
surfers are typically reluctant to give any personal information about
themselves to the publishers of a site.'
Technically, the Internet is a collection of interconnected computer
networks based on a standard known as Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).8 ' Computers which use this protocol make up
what is known as "the Internet.""2 An IP address is registered to a particular
server and consists of a set of numbers.83 Web surfers can access a site by
using this IP address." However, an "alias" is usually used instead of the
actual numeric IP address.8 " Until recently, the Internet has been governed by
NSFnet Internet Network Information Center (InterNIC), a consortium
involving the National Science Foundation (NSF) and a private company,
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI)." NSI had principal authority to register IP
aliases through what have become known as "domain names." ' The domain
names are generally represented by a hierarchical format of
server.organization.type, such as "www.msnbc.com."

76. Matthew Fordahl, World Wide Web Pages Average 19 Clicks of Separation,
PEORiA J. STAR (Peoria, Illinois), September 9, 1999, at A8. The study also suggested that even
if the Web grows 1,000 percent, the distance would change only from nineteen clicks to twenty-

one. Id.

Reno II,31 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
Id
Zick, supra note 15, at 1158.
Reno II,31 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
81. MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL. SoFrwAE AND INTERNEr LAW 15 (2000).
82. Id. The technical standards for this protocol, including changes and updates to this
protocol, are set by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Id. at 1081.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. Id. at 15-16.
77.
78.
79.
80.

87. Id.at 16.
88. Id.
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In 1999, the assigning of domain names was opened to a group of entities
operating under the authority of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). 89 For this system to work, someone must maintain a
list of valid IP addresses and their aliases. 9' The addresses and aliases are
entered into a series of domain name servers (DNS) which are updated
regularly. 9" If the domain name is on the list, then a web suffer will be able to
type in the alias'and find the corresponding page on the Web.' 2
B. "BOUNDARIES" IN CYBERSPACE

After gaining a general knowledge of the Internet and the World Wide
Web, the tenuous nature of the boundaries from website to website becomes
apparent. In real space, geographical boundaries exist. When someone talks
to a person in real space, the person's identity, appearance, location, and
approximate age are generally known and even hard to conceal in many cases.
When people communicate in cyberspace, however, that knowledge of
identity, appearance, location, and approximate age disappear. Hence, in real
space, governments can create zones within communities in which either
children or merchants of adult material are denied access.' 3 A clear example
is a bar. Most taverns require that people entering be of a minimum age, often
age twenty-one. Indeed, bars will often employ people to stand at the door for
the specific duty of checking people's identification and denying minors'
access.

In cyberspace, however, this type of age verification is much more
difficult, if not impossible, because once material is published on the Web, it
New
is available -to any anonymous web suffer in any community.'
technologies are in the works which might create reliable boundaries in
cyberspace or a reliable way of identifying a web surfer's age, but these
technologies are still in their infancy." Without the help of such technology,
"it will be virtually impossible to transfer real space zoning principles to
cyberspace.""

89. Id.

90.
91.

Id. at 1081.
ld.

92. Id.
93. Zick, supra note 15, at 1147.
94. Id. at 1148.
95. Id. These technologies under development include gateway technology, ratings
systems, and domain naming. id.
96. Id.
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Il. COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (CDA)
A. DESCRIPTION OF CDA

The first attempt at regulation of children's access to adult materials on
the Internet was Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 known as the
It contained two
"Communications Decency Act of 1996" (CDA).'
provisions which would later be challenged in the Reno I case." The first
provision" prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent
messages to any recipient under eighteen years of age. "' The second
provision"0 ' prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive
messages in a manner that is available to a person under eighteen years of
age."0 2 The Act also provides affirmative defenses.'0 3

Id.

Id

97.
98.
99.

CDA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
See Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844.
CDA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a). It provides that:
Whoever in interstate or foreign communications... by means of a
telecommunications device knowingly makes, creates, or solicits, and
initiates the transmission of any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing
that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age,
regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call
or initiated the communication;. . . knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity...
with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title
18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

100.
101.

Id.
Id. at § 223(d). It provides:
Whoever in interstate or foreign communications knowingly uses an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under
18 years of age, or uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or
initiated the communication; or knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an
activity prohibited... with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall
be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

102.
103.

Id.
Id. at § 223(e)(5). It provides an affirmative defense for whoever has:
.. taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a
communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any
appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications,
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B. RENO V. ACLU (RENO 1)'04

Immediately after the President signed the CDA into law, twenty
plaintiffs filed suit against U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and the
Department of Justice challenging the constitutionality of the two
provisions." 5 The Court held that the two portions of the CDA at issue were
unconstitutional."°" First, the Court determined that the provisions were not
merely time, manner, and place restrictions but rather content-based blanket
restrictions." The Court also distinguished the Pacifica case by stating that,
unlike broadcast radio, people had to take affirmative steps to access the
Internet. As such, the Internet more resembled the telephone medium in the
Sable case. Just as people had to take affirmative steps in dialing their phones

to receive an indecent message, people had to take affirmative steps in
connecting to the Internet by opening the web browser, and finding a site with
indecent material on it.'" Finding no rationale for a lesser standard of review,
the Court applied strict scrutiny to the review of these provisions.,0 9
Under strict scrutiny, the provisions must be narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling government interest."' The Court found that the
government did have a compelling interest in protecting children, but found
that the government did not meet its burden of showing that the provisions
including any method which is feasible under available technology; or

Id.

has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number.

104. 521 U.S. 844.
105. Id. at 861. The district court had entered a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of both of the challenged provisions after determining that the provisions were
overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, and that the affirmative defenses were not
"technologically or economically feasible for most providers." Id. at 861-62.
106. Id. at 885. Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist dissented in part. They felt that the
CDA should not be invalidated when applied to individuals who send an indecent
communication knowing all recipients are minors, as would be the case with an e-mail sent to
a known juvenile. Id. at 897 (O'Conner, J., dissenting in part).
107. Id. at 868.
108. Id at 866-70. The Court reasoned that the "Internet requires a series of affirmative
steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial." Id. at 854. The Court also noted
that the order in Pacifica was not punitive in the way the criminal statute here was. Plus, the

Court noted that radio had historically "received the most limited First Amendment protection,
in large part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from unexpected
program content." Id. at 867.
109. Id. at 868.
110. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 868.

NORTHERN IWUNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

were narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest."' The provisions were not
found to be narrowly tailored because the Court felt that the government failed
to show why less restrictive alternatives would not be as effective as the

CDA." 2 In addition, the provisions could not be considered narrowly tailored

because of their ineffectiveness in limiting children's access to adult sites
because some minors would have3 access to credit cards and because foreign
sites would remain unregulated.'
The Court also found that the provisions were too vague to allow for

criminal prosecution because the term "indecent" was not defined in the CDA.
Further, the term could not be measured by contemporary community
standards because of the global nature of the InteMet."' Additionally, the
Court found the provisions to be overbroad because they may affect small web
publishers who do not have access to the age-verification methods mentioned
in the affirmative defense, yet only intend their pages to be viewed by
adults." 5 The Court stated that the affirmative defenses would not save the
provisions because the defenses were not reliable means of verifying age, and6
because they would stifle the speech of smaller, non-commercial publishers."1
The Court determined that "existing technology did not include any effective
method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to his
communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults."".
The Court also sought to distinguish this case from the Ginsberg case."'
First, the statute in Ginsberg did not prohibit parents from allowing their
children to view the material, whereas the provisions in the CDA would
presumably still be in effect even if the parents had given the children

permission to view the material on the Internet." 9 Second, the statute in

111. Id. at 875. The Court explained that the government's interest in protecting
children "does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults."
Id.
112. Id. at 879.
113. Seeid.at882.
114. Id. at 872-73. The Court felt that the vagueness derived from the lack of any
definition for "indecent" and "patently offensive," and to how the terms related to each other.
Id. The Court found that the vagueness of the provisions would also lead to a chilling effect on
speech because the severity of a criminal sanction of up to two years in prison "may well cause
speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and
images." Id at 872.
115. See id. at 874-77. The Court found that "it would be prohibitively expensive for
non-commercial - as well as some commercial - speakers who have Web sites to verify that
their users are adults." Id at 877.
116. Reno I, 521 U.S. at 881-82.
117. Id. at876.
118. Id. at 864-67.
119. Id. at 865.
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Ginsberg applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA did
not. 0 Third, the CDA provisions omit the "without serious literary, political,
scientific, or artistic value" terminology."' Finally, the New York statute in
Ginsbergdefined a minor as a person under the age of seventeen, whereas the

CDA applied to all those under eighteen years of age."

The Court also distinguished the Renton case." The Court found that,
unlike Renton, the provisions here were not designed to prevent the secondary
effects of the indecent speech, such as increases in neighborhood crime rates

and deteriorating property values, but rather the primary effects of viewing the
indecent material." In addition, the Court found the incorporation of real life
zoning laws in cyberspace to be inappropriate since cyberspace contained little
or none of the geographic boundaries of real space.12' As a result, the U.S.
Supreme Court held the two provisions of the CDA to be unconstitutional
because of vagueness, overbreadth, and the fact that they were not narrowly

tailored. 12

IV. CHILD ONLINE PROTECTON ACT (COPA)
A. DESCRIPTION OF COPA

In response to the constitutional problems associated with the CDA,
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)127 in October
1998.12 s Like the CDA, COPA is a criminal statute.1 2 COPA provides that:
(1). . . Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce
by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful to
minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not
more than 6 months, or both. (2)... In addition... whoever

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

hd
Id
Reno 1,521 U.S. at 865-66.
Id. at 867-68.
1&

Id
126. Id at 864-85. The Court declined the government's argument that the provisions
should be saved, by construing them narrowly, because it felt that doing so would be tantamount
to rewriting the law. Id at 882-85.
127. COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230-31.
128. Reno I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476-77.
129. See COPA, 47 U.S.C.A § 231.
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intentionally violates such paragraph shall be subject to a
fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation... [E]ach
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation. (3)..
• In addition. . .whoever violates Paragraph (1) shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each
violation. . . [E]ach day of violation shall constitute a
separate violation.'"
COPA specifically provides that "[a] person shall be considered to make a
communication for commercial purposes only if such person is engaged in the
business of making such communications."' 3 ' It states:
The term "engaged in the business" means that the person
who makes a communication, or offers to make a
communication, by means of the World Wide Web, that
includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes
time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course
of such person's trade or business, with the objective of
earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is
not necessary that the person make a profit or that the
making or offering to make such communications be the
person's sole or principal business or source of income). A
person may be considered to be engaged in the business of
making, by means of the World Wide Web, communications
for commercial purposes that include material that is
harmful to minors, only if the person knowingly causes the
material that is harmful to minors to be posted on the World
Wide Web or knowingly solicits such material to be posted
32
on the World Wide Web.

130.

COPA, 47 U.S.C.A § 231. Congress defined "harmful to minors" as:
. . any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that the
average person, alplying contemporary community standards, would
*

find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;

depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition
of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and taken as a whole,

lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

Id. at § 231(e)(6).

131.
132.

Id. at § 231(e)(2)(a).
Id. at § 231(e)(2)(B).
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33
A minor is defined under COPA as any person under seventeen years of age.'
COPA provides affirmative defenses to prosecution under the statute. It
provides that:

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section
that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by
minors to material that is harmful to minors by requiring use
of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number; by accepting a digital
certificate that verifies age; or by any other reasonable
3
measures that are feasible under available technology."
B. COMPARISON TO CDA

Unlike the CDA, COPA only regulates commercial webmasters of sexual
materials deemed harmful to minors.13 COPA is also much more limited in
its scope in that it only deals with the World Wide Web and does not regulate
other areas of the Internet such as chat rooms and listserves.'" COPA gave
greater attention to detail in defining what type of speech would fit into the
37 COPA also reduced the
regulated area than what appeared in the CDA.
minimum age of those who may permissibly view the websites mentioned in
the statute from eighteen to seventeen. 3 The penalty for violation of COPA
remained, however, essentially the same as that found in the CDA: heavy fines
and imprisonment. The time of imprisonment, however, was reduced from
two years to six months. 39 Yet, COPA also plainly states that each day of the
4°
violation shall be considered a separate violation.' Although COPA only
regulates those who are involved in the Web for commercial purposes, its
4
definition of "engaged in the business" is quite broad.1 ' It includes in its
definition of "engaged in the business" those Who have the "objective of
42
earning a profit as a result of such activities;"' however, "it is not necessary
that the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

139.
140.

141.
142.

Id. at § 231(e)(7).
Id. at § 231(c).
Zick, supra note 15, at 1150.
Id.
Compare COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6) with CDA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
Compare COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(7) with CDA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
Compare COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) with CDA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(2).
Zick, supra note 15, at 1175.
COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(2)(B).
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communications be the person's sole or principal business or source of
income."' 43 As did the CDA, COPA contains affirmative defenses to
prosecution under the statute.'" These affirmative defenses, of course, still
allow the government to bring charges against a'defendant, but would allow
that defendant to escape conviction if the defenses are proven.4 s COPA also
differs from the CDA in that it permits parents to allow material deemed
"harmful to minors" to be viewed by their children who are under the age of
seventeen without liability.'"
C. ACLU V. RENO (RENO I!)147

Immediately after COPA was signed into law, the ACLU and various
other plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of it, claiming
that it violated the First Amendment to the Constitution. 4 ' After the court
determined that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit,'49 the plaintiffs
argued that COPA was unconstitutional on three grounds: 1) that it is facially
invalid under the First Amendment for restricting speech that is
constitutionally protected for adults; 2) that it is facially invalid for violating
minors' First Amendment rights; and 3) that it is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad under the First and Fifth Amendments.'" The plaintiffs also argued
that a less restrictive means to achieve the goal of denying the access of minors
to materials that are harmful to them was the use of "blocking" or "filtering"

143.

Id.

144. See id. at § 231(c)
145. Zick, supra note 15, at 1176.
146. Id. at 1178.
147. 31 F. Supp. 2d 473. The decision in Reno 1I was later appealed and affirnned.
(Reno III discussed infra Part VI-D). The new United States Attorney General, John Ashcroft,
filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision in Reno III and the U.S. Supreme
Court granted it on May 21, 2001. Ashcroft v. ACLU, No. 00-1293, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3820,

at *1 (U.S. May 21, 2001).
148.

Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476-77.

149. Id. at 481. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing
because the court felt that if the plaintiffs' interpretation, which the court found to be
reasonable, was proven, they could potentially face criminal prosecution for their websites.
Additionally, the court recognized, under the First Amendment, that litigants "are permitted to
challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of
ajudicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988), quoted inReno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
150. Reno ll, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 477. The court had previously entered a temporary
restraining order on November 20, 1998, enjoining the enforcement of COPA, pending the
decision on the preliminary injunction. Id.
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technology.' The plaintiffs further argued that the blocking software is also
more effective than COPA because, unlike the statute, it will restrict minors'
access to foreign and non-profit sites.' The defense argued that COPA was
constitutional because it passes the strict scrutiny of First Amendment

review."'
The Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the
1, 1999.1'4
enforcement of COPA was granted by the district court on February
Relying on the Reno I decision, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
s
of Pennsylvania applied strict scrutiny to the analysis of COPA.' The court
looked to the burden placed upon speech. It found that "[a] statute is'
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial
56
burden on speakers because of the content of their speech."' The plaintiffs
presented evidence that the financial burden on smaller, commercial
webmasters could be such that their expression of speech could be severely
diminished.' 7 The evidence showed that the start-up cost of credit card or

age-verification services ranges from a few hundred dollars to thousands of
dollars.' 8 In the alternative, a webmaster could pay for the services of a third
party to provide online management of the credit card verification, although

151. Id. at 492. These types of programs may be downloaded and installed on a user's
home computer at a price of approximately $40.00. They can be used to block access to an
entire website or specific pages within a website. Examples of these types of programs are
Surfwatch, NetNanny, and Cyberpatrol. Id.
152. Id. The blocking software option also has its own difficulties, however, in that it
may block out some appropriate sites and that a computer-savvy child may be able to defeat the
program. Id.
153. Id.
154. Zick, supra note 15, at 1150 n.21. The Department of Justice filed a notice of
appeal from the district court's preliminary injunction on April 2, 1999. Id.
155. Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
156. Id. The court felt that even if the defendant could show that the implementation of
a credit card or adult verification system would be affordable to the plaintiffs at bar, that would
not be enough. The court ruled that the First Amendment requires looking at the burden that
the statute places on the type of speech itself, not just the financial burden upon the plaintiffs.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115
(1991) cited in Reno 11,31 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
157. Reno 1I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 488. A webmaster would have to complete several steps
to place an age or credit card verification system, including: 1) "setting up a merchant account;"
2) "retaining the services of an authorized Internet-based credit card clearinghouse;" 3)
"inserting common gateway interface, or CGI, scripts;" 4) "possibly rearranging the content on
the Web site;" 5) "storing credit card numbers or passwords in a database;" and 6) "obtaining
a secure server to transmit the credit card numbers." lId
158. Id. The webmaster may even have had to transfer to a different ISP if the server
which they currently used did not support credit card verification or CGI scripts. A secure
server which supports credit card verification may cost a few thousand dollars. Id.
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the website would incur additional costs for this service."5 9 These third parties
would verify the credit cards for the adult webmaster and issue the web surfer
an identification number which would be stored in the third party's database. "
This would allow access to the adult areas of the webmaster's site upon the
web surfer's entering of the identification number. 6 ' Evidence provided by
plaintiffs suggested that COPA would reduce anonymity of web surfers and
thus lead to a great reduction in the traffic to the websites by adult web
surfers.'62 The district court determined that given the economical disadvantages, adult webmasters may engage in self-censorship of constitutionally*protected speech." 3 In addition, the court found that COPA may also affect
the free expression of speech in other internet communications such as chat
rooms located within the website and would thus burden speech in an area not
even covered by COPA.'"
Having established the burden on speech created by COPA and that strict
scrutiny should apply, the court went on to consider the plaintiffs' likelihood
of success in showing that COPA is not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest." Not surprisingly, the court found that the
government has a compelling interest in the protection of minors from adult
materials deemed to be "harmful to minors.""' The court did not find that the
statute was narrowly tailored, however, because it felt that other means of
accomplishing the government's interest were available which were less
restrictive of constitutionally-protected freedom of speech and that these
alternatives were as effective, if not more effective, than a criminal statute." 7
The court found that blocking programs were available and were much less
restrictive of adults' freedom of speech."68 Although these blocking programs
were not found to be completely effective in restricting children's access, they
appeared to be more effective than COPA because the software could restrict
159. Id.
160. Id.at 489.
161. Id. Adult Check is an example of such a third party. A webmaster can sign up
with Adult Check for free and earn up to 50 to 60% commissions from web surfers that signed
up for Adult Check from that webmaster's site. Adult Check provides webmasters with a script
free of charge which the webmaster can then place anywhere on her site that she wishes to block
access to minors. A web surfer may obtain an Adult Check identification number for a small
yearly fee which may be paid online with a credit card or through mail with a check and a copy
of a driver's license or passport. Id. at 489-490.
162. Id. at 491.
163. Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 491.

164.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.

Id. at 492.
Id at 495.
Id at 497.
Id.
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access to foreign sites as well as domestic ones. 69 In addition, the
effectiveness of COPA was questionable considering that minors may have
access to a credit card." T°
The court determined that the language of the statute was also not the
least restrictive manner in which to achieve the goal of protecting children.17 1
For instance, limiting the prohibited forms of content to only pictures, images,
or graphic image files, rather than "any communication, picture, image,
graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind," as
stated in the statute, would have been a less restrictive way of effectively
restricting minors' access to the "teasers" commonly found on adult
commercial sites.'17 The court asserted that the goals of COPA might have
been equally accomplished with the imposition of a penalty less severe than
criminal liability."' Also, the court mentioned that COPA may be less
restrictive of constitutional rights if the elements in the affinative defenses
were instead made necessary elements of the prosecution.174 In sum, the court
found that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success in a trial on the merits of
showing that COPA was not narrowly tailored in that it was not the least
75
restrictive means available of achieving the goal of protecting children.1
D. ACLU V. RENO (RENO 111)176

The decision of the district court in Reno HI was appealed by the Attorney
General and oral arguments were heard on November 4, 1999." The Third
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court and upheld the granting of a
preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of COPA. After
determining that the district court had properly found that the plaintiffs had
established standing, the circuit court began its analysis.77 The circuit court
agreed with the district court that COPA was a content-based restriction on

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
Id. at 496-97.
laat497.
Id.
Id.
Id.
31 F. Supp 2d at 498.
Reno 11,

176. 217 F.3d 162. The new United States Attorney General, John Ashcroft, filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision in Reno III and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted that petition on May 21, 2001. Ashcroft, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3820, at *1. The U.S.
Supreme Court will likely review the Reno III decision sometime during the term which starts
in October of 2001.
217 F.3d at 162.
177. Reno 11I,
178.

Id. at 171-72.
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speech and, as such, strict scrutiny should apply.'79 The circuit court agreed
that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children from
harmful materials such as pornography."s
The circuit court affirmed the decision of the district court, but on much
narrower grounds.'
The circuit court only addressed the issue of overbreadth.8 2 The court found COPA's definition of "harmful to minors" and its
application of "contemporary community standards" to be unconstitutionally
overbroad."8 3 The court found this overbreadth so concerning as to alleviate
the need for reviewing any of the other provisions of COPA.'u The court
based its entire opinion on this overbreadth and ignored the other grounds
relied on by the district court.'" The court felt that the same "community
standards" overbreadth problems found in the CDA remain in COPA. '86 The
court held that determining community standards on the Web was impossible
because: 1) of the global nature of the Internet; 2) once material is placed on
the Web, it is available to everyone unless password or credit card protected;
3) no reliable age-verification system exists; 4) the Web has no geographic
boundaries; and 5) current technology does not allow webmasters to prevent

179. Id. at 173.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 173-74.
183. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 173-74.
184. Id. at 174. The court felt that "this aspect of COPA, without reference to its other
provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire
COPA statute." d
185. Id. at 174n.19. The court stated:
..we do not find it necessary to address the District Court's analysis of
the definition of "commercial purposes"; whether the breadth of the
forms of content covered by COPA could have been more narrowly
tailored; whether the affirmative defenses impose too great a burden on
Web publishers or whether those affirmative defenses should have been
included as elements of the crime itself; whether COPA's inclusion of
criminal as well as civil penalties was excessive; whether COPA is
designed to include communications made in chat rooms, discussion
groups and links to other Web sites; whether the government is entitled
to so restrict communications when children will continue to be able to
access foreign Web sites and other sources of material that is harmful to
them; what taken "as a whole" should mean in the context of the Web and
the Internet; or whether the statute's failure to distinguish between
material that is harmful to a six year old versus a sixteen year old is
problematic.
Id.
186. Id. at 174. The court stated: "We are not persuaded that the Supreme Court's
concern with respect to the "community standards" criterion has been sufficiently remedied by
Congress in COPA." Id.
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their material from being viewed by specific geographic locations with
differing community standards.3 7 This fact means that a webmaster would
need to apply the most restrictive community's standards in order to avoid
criminal liability.'" Thus, minors would be prevented from accessing
materials even if not deemed harmful to them in their particular geographic
community, making COPA overly broad in its application.'89
The government argued that subjecting webmasters to varying
community standards has been upheld in other cases, depending on the
community in which the conduct took place.1'" The court held that those cases
are distinguishable because, unlike the Web, there existed an ability to control
the distribution of the indecent material into different geographic locations. 9 '
Defendants could thus avoid liability by avoiding those geographic locations
with stricter community standards."' Webmasters, on the other hand,
currently have no way of controlling which geographic locations view their
published materials, thus forcing the webmaster to either apply the most strict
community standard or forgo publication altogether.'"
To elaborate on the court's reasoning, COPA uses community standards
to determine what is "harmful to minors," but fails to define the relevant
community that will set the standard.'" Given the global nature of the Internet
and the fact that once a page is published on the Net, the publisher has no way
to keep it out of a particular community, trying to determine a relevant
community standard seems illogical. If a minor views sexual material in a
sexually-conservative community on a web page that was published in a
sexually-liberal community, which community standard should apply?"95
Because publishers cannot predict what community standards will be used to

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
Cir. 1996),

Id. at 175.
Id.
Reno III, 217 F.3d.at 176.
Id. at 175. (Such as the "dial-a-por" in the Sable case).
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 176. The court also distinguished United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th
in which the Sixth Circuit applied differing community standards in determining

material placed on an electronic bulletin board to be harmful to minors, even if the material was

acceptable in the community from which it was sent. Yet, access to the electronic bulletin board
was available online only to members with passwords, and the geographic locations of these
members could be determined before the passwords were issued. The defendants in that case
could have thus refused to issue passwords to members in less tolerant communities. Id.
193. Id.
194. Zick, supra note 15, at 1194.
195. Some have suggested using an "intemet community standard." See Doherty, supra
note 15, at 288. Problems still arise, however, because the Internet community is so varied that
it doesn't share a standard like geographic communities might. Id.
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determine what is "harmful to minors," webmasters will be unable to predict
what will and what will not be considered "harmful to minors."' 96
The court stated that before they would invalidate a statute because of
overbreadth they must first determine if it can be limited so as to cure the
overbreadth by narrowing the meaning to the language of the statute itself or
by deleting the portion of the statute that is unconstitutional." 9' The court
refused to accept the government's suggestion that the statute be interpreted
narrowly by construing the "contemporary community standards" language in
COPA as an "adult" rather than as a "geographic" standard." The court
refused because it found no evidence that "adults everywhere in America
would share the same standards for determining what is harmful to minors."' 99
The court also refused to strike the overbroad "contemporary community
standards" language from COPA because the standard is "an integral part of
the statute, permeating and influencing the whole of the statute."M' The court
also refused to deny application of the overbreadth doctrine because of the
commercial nature of COPA, because even though the Supreme Court has
refused to apply the doctrine to statutes regulating commercial advertising,
COPA regulated more than just commercial advertising. 2 1
While stating its inapplicability at present to the World Wide Web, the
court was careful in stating that the holding does not diminish the application
of Miller's "contemporary community standards" test 1 2 The court also said
that even though the district court focused on "the availability, virtues and
effectiveness of voluntary blocking or filtering software that can enable
parents to limit the harmful material to which their children may otherwise be
exposed, the parental hand should not be looked to as a substitute for a
congressional mandate."' Thus, the court leaves open the possibility of laws
like COPA being constitutional if reliable geographic and age-verification
technology is invented. The court stated its "firm conviction that developing

196. Id. at 289.
197. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502, cited in Reno 111, 217 F.3d at 177.
198. Reno IlI, 217 F.3d at 178.
199. Id. "To the contrary, it is significant to us that throughout case law, community
standards have always been interpreted as a geographic standard without uniformity." American
Libraries Ass'n v.Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), citedin Reno 111,217 F.3d
at 178.
200. Reno 111, 217 F.3d at 179. "We see no means by which to excise those

.unconstitutional' elements of the statute from those that are constitutional... ." Id.
201. Id. at 179 n.22.
202. Id. at 180. "We remain satisfied that Miller's 'community standards' test continues
to be a useful and viable tool in contexts other than the Internet and the Web under present
technology." Id.
203. Id. at 181 n.24.
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technology will soon render the "community standards" challenge moot,
thereby making congressional regulation to protect minors from harmful
material on the Web constitutionally practicable."'
V. ANALYSIS OF COPA-LIKE LAWS

The Reno III case left open the possibility of a law like COPA being
constitutionally sound if technology advances to the point where webmasters
can reliably determine the web surfers' ages and approximate geographic
locations. In such a case, the overbreadth problems which caused COPA to be
held unconstitutional in Reno ll would disappear. The next question
becomes: Would a law like COPA be constitutional if such technology
existed? The Reno I case would suggest otherwise. This comment will now
analyze whether a law like COPA would withstand First Amendment scrutiny
if such technology existed.
A.

COPA UNDER RELIABLE GEOGRAPHIC AND AGE-VERIFICATION
TECHNOLOGY

Based on the precedent of the Reno I case, any appellate court reviewing
a law like COPA will likely apply a strict scrutiny standard." A law like
COPA is a content-based restriction upon speech, and as such, will be viewed
by the courts as presumptively invalid . ' Under the strict scrutiny analysis,
the courts will undoubtedly find that the government has a compelling interest
in protecting minors.YO' What remains in doubt, however, is whether the courts
will find such a criminal law to be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.
Assuming that technology advances to the point where webmasters can
reliably determine the age and approximate geographic location of the visitors
to their sites, the government will make many arguments about how a law like
COPA should be found to be narrowly tailored. The government is likely to
argue that a law like COPA meets the concerns mentioned in the Reno I case.
First, they will likely argue that COPA is limited to the effects of adult,
commercial websites, thus avoiding the problems that the CDA faced relating

204. Id. at 181.
205. See Reno ll, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
206. Zick, supra note 15, at 1178.
207. Jacobson, supranote 12, at 437. The "[s]tate's interest in safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling." Ferber,458 U.S. at 757, quoted in
Zick, supra note 15, at 1166-67. "Te Court has stated that this interest extends to shielding
minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards." Sable, 492 U.S.
at 126, quoted inJacobson, supra note 12, at 437.
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to sites maintained by private individuals on nonprofit websites 1 s Second, the
government will point to the affirmative defenses in arguing that webmasters
will be protected from liability if they have made a good faith attempt to
restrict minors' access to indecent materials. 'Third, the vagueness problems
of CDA were addressed in COPA by a more concrete definition of the term
"harmful to minors."' Fourth, the government can also assert that COPA,
unlike the CDA, preserves parents' rights in allowing their children to view
such material.2"' Finally, the government may also assert its right to regulate
the Internet based on the precedent of various internet intellectual property
laws already passed and upheld.21'
The plaintiffs will counter these arguments. First, they will point to the
broad definition of "engaged in the business" found within COPA. COPA
does not require the website to make a profit or for it to be the webmaster's
principal business."' This definition of "engaged in the business" is
problematic because many webmasters attempt to make a profit in ways other
than by selling access to adult material." 3 For example, they may offer all
material for free, but attempt to make a profit through advertisements on their
website." 4 A webmaster might also accept contributions from supporters while
leaving access to materials on the site free to visitors.2"' Thus, these websites
would be considered commercial sites by the statute, but the webmasters may
have no desire to utilize age-verification technology on their site because
doing so would likely reduce the adult traffic to their site.
A law like COPA may place a considerable burden on free speech when
one considers the relative ease of webmasters to procure their own webspace
for sexually-explicit sites and to receive advertising for those websites.
Several free web servers exist which allow anyone with an internet connection
to build his own adult website free of charge. 2t' Several "partnership
programs" are available on the Web which offer "click-through" incentives
and commissions."' These programs usually involve a webmaster placing a
208. Jacobson, supra note 12, at 439.

209. Id. at 438.
210. Id. at 441.
211. Id.
212. See COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(2)(B).
213. See Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
214. See id
215. Cf. id.
216. See, e.g., Free Webhosting, at http://www.xxxcity.net/freehost.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 1999) (listing several such free hosts of adult sites).
217.

See, e.g., Partnership Programs, at http://www.webmasterland.com/pages/

Money..programs-Partnerships.shtml (last visited Mar. 1,2001) (listing several advertisers for
adult site webmasters).

2001]

UNTANGLING THE WORLD WIDE WEB

"banner" on her site that links a web surfer to the partnership program
provider.2 18 Thus, small websites which advertise in such a manner would be
forced, under a law like COPA, to use an age-verification system even though
their adult material itself is not commercial in nature. COPA would therefore
be restricting a form of non-commercial speech. This type of overbreadth
problem is similar to that which helped lead the Supreme Court to strike down
the CDA. 21'
Even the Justice Department found problems with COPA.2 It felt that
COPA may divert resources away from "more important initiatives, such as
combating online traffickers of hard-core child pornography and predators of
The Justice Department also complained that there are
children."'
ambiguities in the scope of COPA and that such ambiguities hinted that the
statute may not be narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interests.m
The Justice Department was also concerned over effectiveness of enforcement
because "40% of web content originates overseas and cannot be regulated by
Unites States law."'
B. OTHER EARLY LANDMARK CASES

Some cases decided in federal courts across the country after the Reno 1
decision may provide some insight into the current state of law in this area and
how courts will handle COPA-like laws.
1. Cyberspacev. Engle?"
A Michigan state lawtm made it a criminal offense to disseminate
sexually explicit materials to minors via computer.' Plaintiffs challenged the
218. See id The click-through incentives are usually three to five cents for every web
surfer who clicks on the banner and a commission for every one of those web surfers coming
from the webmaster's site that purchases something from the partnership program provider.
219. Doherty, supra note 15, at 283.
220. Department of Justice Letter on CDA I, at http://www.aclu.org/

courtlacluvrenoii-dojjetter.htnl (last visited Oct. 23, 1998), cited in Doherty, supra note 15,
at 285.
221.
222.

Id.
Id. The Justice Department was especially troubled by the ambiguities that arise

as to which "contemporary community standard" would be dispositive. Id.
223. Id.
224. 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
225. 1999 Public Act 33 Amendments, M.C.L. 722.671 et seq. (1978).

226. Cyberspace,55 F. Supp. 2d at 740. Violation of the statute is a felony punishable
by up to two years in prison and a fine of $10,000. Criminal sanctions could be applied if the
sexually explicit material originated, terminated, or both originated and terminated in the State
of Michigan. id
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statute on grounds that it violated the First Amendment and the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.22 Under the court's Commerce Clause
analysis, the court determined that most web addresses for pages on servers
within the United States contain no geographic indicators.2" The court ruled
that the Internet is an instrument of interstate commerce. "' The court also
determined that information on the Internet cannot be stopped at the Michigan
border.' o The court ruled that the statute violated the Commerce Clause
because it: 1) attempted to regulate activities that may occur entirely outside
of the state; 2) created an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce; and 3)
subjected internet users to inconsistent state regulations."
Applying strict scrutiny to the Michigan statute under First Amendment
analysis, the court found that the state had a compelling interest in sheltering
children from sexually explicit material, but found that the state failed to show
that the statute was narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest because less
restrictive means were available, namely, blocking software." The court also
decided that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would
restrict the speech of adults as well as minors. 3 These findings by the court

227. See id. The power granted to the U.S. government to regulate interstate commerce
is also seen as a limitation over state governments' ability to regulate it. This limitation over
state governments' power to regulate interstate commerce is known as the "Dormant Commerce
Clause." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
228. Cyberspace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 744. Many websites outside of the U.S. have
indicators as to the country of origin within the domain name. For example, in
"www.nic.ad.jp," the ".jp" designates a Japanese website. The Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) has a list of these country indicators. See IANA Root-Zone Whois Index by
TLD Code, at http://www.iana.org/cctld/ccld-whois.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001). "iD"
stands for "Top Level Domain" and refers to designations such as "Jp" or ".com" in the domain
name. LEMLEY, supra note 81, at 1081.
229. Cyberspace,55 F. Supp. 2d at 744. "Just as goods and services travel over borders
by truck and train, information flows freely across state borders on the internet." Pataki, 969
F. Supp. 160, quoted in Cyberspace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 740.

230. Cyberspace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
231. Cyberspace,55 F. Supp. 2d at 753-54. But see People v.Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2000). The court found a California state law which prohibited the
distribution of harmful matter to a minor over the internet did not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Hsu, however, dealt with an instant message sent to a specific, known
minor, rather than merely making the material available on a website. Id.
232. Cyberspace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 750-51.
233. Id. at 747.
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led it to grant the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction pending final
determination of these issues.'
2. ACLU v. Johnson23'
A New Mexico statute 6 criminalized the knowing dissemination by
computer of material that is "harmful to minors."3' The court concluded that
the state failed to meet its burden under First Amendment strict scrutiny. The
state did not show that the statute was narrowly tailored to effectuate the
compelling state interest of protecting children.?' The court reasoned that
without the presence of a reliable age-verification system, any attempt at
enforcement of the statute would lead to ineffective results in that children
9
would still be able to access adult sites if they had access to a credit card.
In addition, the statute would stifle the speech of adults because without a
reliable age-verification system it would be impossible for any webmaster to
place any material that might be deemed harmful to minors on the Internet
without "knowing" that the material could be accessed by a minor, thus
making them criminally liable merely for publishing the material itself.'
Additionally, the court determined that- the statute violated the Commerce
Clause for the same reasons elaborated by the Cyberspace Court."
3. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County
Library2' 2
Plaintiffs in this case claimed that their access to websites was
3
The
unconstitutionally blocked by the defendant library board's policy.
library's policy was to block all material on the Web that it deemed harmful
to juveniles with web blocking software.' The defendant library argued that
5
it had the absolute right to limit what it provides to the public.' The court

234. Id. at 754.
235. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
236. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(a) (Michiel998).
237. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1152. Defendants appealed from a grant of a preliminary

injunction
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

enjoining the enforcement of the statute. Id.
Id.at 1159.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161-64.
24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
Id. at 556.

244. Id. A library patron could make a written request to the librarian to unblock a site
if she submitted her name and the reason she wanted the site unblocked.
245. Id.
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found that while the library is not required to give its patrons access to the
Internet, if it chooses to do so, it has limited ability to restrict access to it under
the First Amendment.'" The court ruled that since the policy sought-to limit
the receipt of information on the basis of its content, the policy was subject to
strict scrutiny under First Amendment review." The defendant claimed that
the policy was the least restrictive method of securing the compelling
government interests of: "1)minimizing access to illegal pornography; and 2)
avoidance of creation of a sexually hostile environment... ."8 Because the

defendant could provide little or no evidence that the policy minimized illegal
pornography or reduced the occurrence of a sexually hostile environment, the
court found that the library had failed to meet its burden of showing that the
policy was reasonably necessary to further the accomplishment of the stated
government interests. u9 In addition, the court found that the policy was not
narrowly tailored because of the existence of less restrictive alternatives like
privacy screens or limiting the blocking software to only a few computers.'
The court also found the policy overinclusive because it limited the access not
just of minors, but of adult patrons as well."' The court further ruled that
because the library's ability to censor was virtually unbounded, and because
no opportunity for review of a decision not to unblock a website was available,
the policy constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. 2
4. Urofsky v. Gilmore53

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of a Virginia law2
restricting state employees from accessing sexually explicit material on
computers that are owned or leased by the state. 5 The court found that the

246.
247.
248.

Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.

Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2dat 564.

249. Id.at 566.
250. Id. at 567.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 568. Unconstitutional prior restraint of speech occurs "whenever the
government makes the enjoyment of protected speech contingent upon obtaining permission
from government officials to engage in its exercise under circumstances that permits
government officials unfettered discretion to grant or deny the permission." Baltimore
Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 58 F.3d 988, 996 (4th Cir. 1995), quoted in
Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 568.

253. 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1999).
254. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-804 to -806 (Michie Supp. 1998).
255. Urofsky, 167 F.3dat 194. Under the law, a state agency head could give permission
for a state employee to access sexually explicit material if the agency head deemed such access
to be required in connection with a bona fide research project.
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law did not regulate the speech of private citizens, but rather the speech of
Since the speech
state employees in their capacity as such employees.'
restriction only affected the employees in performance of their duties, the court
ruled that the employer had a right to determine how those duties are
performed." Because the law did not touch upon a matter of public concern,
it did not violate the First Amendment. 2 8 Although this case did not deal
specifically with minors, it provided an example of a restriction on sexually
explicit material over the Internet that was held constitutional.
C. RULE OF LAW

These four early landmark cases help shed some light on the burgeoning
area of law relating to the restriction of children's access to adult sites on the
Web. Although the small number of cases in this area makes determining a
trend difficult, we can find some common threads. First, any state law
attempting to regulate children's access to the Internet may encounter
Commerce Clause problems. As the Cyberspace and Johnson cases make
clear, the Web has thus far been viewed as a carrier of interstate and
international commerce.s 9 Although the Virginia law in Urofsky was upheld,
it was not challenged on Commerce Clause grounds. The Cyberspace and
Johnson cases would at least suggest that any regulation in this'area will have
to be a result of federal rather than state legislation. Turning to First
Amendment issues, internet regulations similar to that of COPA will be
reviewed under strict scrutiny.' ° This fact poses quite a challenge to
lawmakers in that such regulations will be viewed as presumptively invalid
unless it can be shown that no effective, less restrictive alternative is
available."
D. FUTURE TRENDS

Three views will now be explored about the future of the law relating to
the restriction of adult materials from children on the World Wide Web. The
u2
first is one espoused by Vickie Byrd in her note in the Howard Law Journal.

256.
257.
258.

Id. at 196.
ld.
Id.

259. See Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149; see also Cyberspace,55 F. Supp. 2d 737.
260. See, e.g., Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149; see also, e.g., Cyberspace, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737.
261. See, e.g., Reno !!, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473.
262. Vickie S. Byrd, Reno v. ACLU --A Lesson in JuridicalImpropriety,42 How. L.
J. 365 (1999).
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She argues that the decision of Reno I should be overruled.2 3 The second
view is that expressed by Debra Keiser in her article in Albany Law Review
stating that the decision in Reno I should be preserved, but the analysis should
be altered. 2' The final view is that of Timothy Zick, asserted in his article in
the Creighton Law Review that the Reno I decision and analysis were correct
and that as such, laws like COPA should be struck down as unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. 2' This comment will rebut the arguments of
Byrd aid Keiser and defend the arguments of Zick by asserting that they are
the ones in accordance with the First Amendment case precedent.
1. Byrd's View

Byrd's note asserts the proposition that the Reno I case was decided
incorrectly and the Supreme Court unconstitutionally usurped congressional
authority.2 Byrd contends that the logic employed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Reno Iwas problematic because technology, rather than constitutional
principles, drove the decision." Byrd's first main contention is that the Reno
ICourt improperly distinguished the Internet from the broadcast medium in
the Pacificacase. 2" In Reno 1,the Court did not lower the standard of review
because, unlike broadcast radio in Pacifica, the Internet: 1) did not have a
history of extensive government regulation; 2) was more similar to the
telephone medium in Sable, and like the phone required affirmative steps on
the part of the user to receive the indecent message since it was not
"pervasive" like radio broadcasts; and 3) did not suffer from the "scarcity"
problem of the radio.' "
Byrd argues that the Internet is more similar to broadcast radio than the
Reno I Court believed because the Internet is a "fairly new medium" and "has
not had a history of extensive government regulation like that of
broadcasting. 27" This argument is odd considering that it is exactly what the
Court in Reno I was saying: that there has been no history of extensive
regulation in the Internet so as to provide a clear mandate of congressional
authority to regulate it.27' But even assuming that Congress does have the
263. See id.
264. See Debra Keiser, Regulating the Internet: A Critique of Reno v. ACLU, 62 ALB.
L. REV.769 (1998).
265. See Zick, supra note 15.
266. See Byrd, supra note 262.
267. See id.
268.

269.
270.
271.

Id. at 375.

See Reno 1,521 U.S. at 866-71.
Byrd, supra note 262, at 375.
See Reno 1,521 U.S. at 868-69.
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authority to extensively regulate the Internet, the regulation at issue in the
Pacificacase was fundamentally different in that it was not a criminal statute,
but rather a FCC regulation. 2' Moreover, one of the major issues of the case
was not just that the "filthy words" were broadcast, but that they were
broadcast at two o'clock in the afternoon when children were likely to be part
Thus, while the regulation may have stifled
of the listening audience.'
expression of indecent material during the day, the broadcasters were still
presumably left with the opportunity of expressing themselves at a later hour.
Byrd argues that the Court's depiction of "a series of affirmative steps"
was incorrect because "[tioday, 'with just a few clicks' of the mouse, a child
can summon pornographic and indecent images that would rattle the
sensitivities of an adult surfing the web."' 2 Yet, even assuming that assertion
is true, it does not change the fact that the Reno I case more closely resembles
the Sable case. Children can simply pick up a phone and dial the number,
probably even more easily than they could visit a pornographic site on the
Internet. Neither the Internet nor the telephone is pervasive to the extent that
the radio is. A person may turn a radio dial with no forewarning about the
content of the next station. " However, a child would mostly likely need some
sort of intent to hear or see the pornographic communication by dialing a
phone number or by finding the adult site.276
Byrd next argues that since the "technology which drives computer
networks is controlled by a very small number of people, one can argue that
computer technology, in general, is also plagued by the 'scarcity' problem that
2
justifies limited First Amendment protection of broadcast communications." "
Yet, the technology driving the Internet is not the scarcity to which the Court
was referring."' For instance, even if we assume that technology is controlled
by a very small number of people, such as Bill Gates for example, the current
27
availability of people to use that-technology is almost limitless. Millions of
people all over the world have used that technology to create their own
websites, and it is those vast numbers of web publishers, not the scarce number
of computer engineers, that make the Web anything but scarce.'

272.

273.
274.
275.
276.

See Pacifica,438 U.S. 726.

See id
Byrd, supra note 262, at 375.
Reno 1,521 U.S. at 869-70.
See id

277. Byrd, supra note 262, at 375-76. "Scarcity" is discussed supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
278.
279.
280.

See Reno 1,521 U.S. at 870.
See id.
Id.
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Byrd then maintains that the Reno I Court's determination of the
vagueness and overbreadth of the CDA provisions was in error. Byrd argues
that the meaning of "indecent" and "patently offensive" was not vague because
"Congress made its intent and understanding apparent in the Conference
Report on the CDA by stating that the term indecency [sic] as it appeared in
the act was to have the same meaning as established in Pacificaand Sable."'
Yet, that legislative history does not change the fact that Congress failed to
incorporate that, or any other, definition into the statute itself.m
Byrd additionally argues that in the Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium case, the United States Supreme Court
"unequivocally rejected a vagueness challenge... [when] the provision at
issue, which allowed cable system operators to prohibit the broadcast of
indecent and obscene programming, used language similar to that adopted by
the Supreme Court in Miller v. California [sic]... [and] was deemed to be
'consistent with the First Amendment."' First, the provisions at issue in the
Denver Area Educational and Telecommunication Consortium case
specifically defined terms in a manner similar to the Miller case, whereas the
CDA failed to define its terms.?" Second, cable television is closer to the
broadcast radio medium found in Pacificathan it is to the telephone or internet
medium.m
Byrd then asserts that the Court in Reno I was incorrect in finding that the
CDA was overbroad.m She states that "[t]he CDA was not a total ban on
indecency; it only criminalized... the knowing display of indecent material to
minors. Hence, under the CDA, adults would still have had access to indecent
materials on the Internet."' The Supreme Court was not saying, however,
that the CDA was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, but rather
overbroad in its application."8 Because no reliable age-verification system
is currently available and because of the number of children currently using the
Internet, it would be impossible for a webmaster to publish any adult material
without "knowing" that it could be viewed by a minor. Thus, in order to avoid
possible prosecution under the statute, the webmaster would have to avoid
publishing the page altogether, which is exactly how the CDA could have

281.
282.
283.
284.
Reno 1, 521
285.
286.
287.
288.

Byrd, supra note 262, at 377.
See CDA 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
Byrd, supra note 262, at 377.
See DenverArea Educational Telecommunications Consortium, 518 U.S. 727; cf.
U.S. at 870.
See Denver Area EducationalTelecommunications Consortium, 518 U.S. 727.
Byrd, supra note 262, at 378.
Id.
See Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844.
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stifled free expression.
Byrd next contends that the CDA was the least restrictive means of
9
achieving the compelling government interest of protecting children.' She
argues that "in order for alternatives to render an existing act unconstitutional,
'
She states: "The
they must be as effective as the challenged law."
restricted in
seriously
is
software,
alternative to the CDA, parental 'self-help'
'' It is true that the efficacy of software blocking programs is
its efficacy."
restricted; however, the CDA was too. Software blocking programs are at
least as effective as, if not more effective than, the CDA, and do not restrict the
freedom of expression of adults in the way the CDA would have.'
2. Keiser's View
In Keiser's article, she argues that even though the Supreme Court's final
decision in the Reno I case was correct, she believes that the analysis was, to
a certain extent, flawed.2 3
Keiser argues that the precedent of Renton should have played a bigger
role in the Court's decision: "What the Supreme Court ignores, and what
Congress does not make clear, is that the CDA is not merely protecting
4
children from viewing harmful material, it is also fighting crime."'
The Court in Renton upheld an ordinance regulating adult theaters, due
to the secondary effects of those theaters, such as crime and deteriorating
property values.2' The Reno ICourt distinguished the Renton case by saying
that the CDA was aimed at the primary effects of the indecent material on the
Internet. ' Hence, the Court determined that the CDA should not be analyzed
as a time, manner, and place restriction but rather as a content restriction, thus
deserving of strict scrutiny.2 '
Keiser argues that the purpose of statutes like the CDA is to contend with
the primary effect of children being exposed to indecent material as well as the
'
Keiser provides several
secondary effects of viewing that material.
examples that she describes as the crimes that are a secondary effect of the
accessibility of adult material on the Internet, such as molesters and murderers
289.

Byrd, supra note 262, at 381.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

291.

Id.
Reno 1,521 U.S. 844. Efficacy of blocking programs discussed infra Part VI.C.
See Keiser, supra note 264.
id. at 796.
See Renton, 475 U.S. 41.
Reno 1,521 U.S. at 867-68.

298.

See Keiser, supra note 264, at 797.

290. Id.

297.

Id.
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luring children from chat rooms into their devious hands. 9' Nonetheless, the
CDA would likely not have kept these unfortunate children away from these
chat rooms. Unless the topics of these chats would be considered "indecent"
or "patently offensive," they would not have been covered by the CDA. These
chats were likely innocent enough in and of themselves. The real indecency
would not likely begin until the children were lured away from the chat room
and into the real world of these offenders. Presumably, a molester could hunt
for child victims in a "clean" chat room just as easily as he could in an
"indecent" one. In addition, the Renton case dealt with a time, manner, and
place restriction in that the zoning ordinance only prohibited an adult theater
from being within 1,000 feet of a school, church, residence, or park."° The
adult theater owners could still express themselves outside of that 1,000 foot
area. Under the CDA, however, many adult webmasters would be forced to
forgo expressing themselves on the Internet altogether.3"'
Next, Keiser argues that the underinclusiveness of the CDA, in its
ineffectiveness against foreign webmasters, should not have been involved in
the determination of the Reno I case.302 Keiser gives two arguments
supporting her assertion.' First, she contends that "most laws intended to
protect children are not infallible. For example, laws exist which aim to
prohibit minors from drinking alcohol. . . ." Second, Keiser argues that the
mere "existence of laws and the consequences of breaking the laws influence
crime rates."0 - Yet, much to the chagrin of party animals everywhere, unlike
speech, the Constitution does not give individuals a right to drink alcohol.'
Therefore, underage drinking laws are not subject to the same strict scrutiny
of review as laws that restrict speech.
3. Zick's View
In Zick's article, he concludes that the Reno I and II cases were decided
correctly.30 7 His contention is that the CDA and COPA would fundamentally
alter the media of the Internet. 3' Zick's view is correct because if COPA were
299. See id
300. See Renton, 475 U.S. 41.
301. See Reno 1,521 U.S. at 872.
302. See Keiser, supra note 264, at 798.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.at 799.
306. Although the Twenty-First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution repealed federal
prohibition, it still permits state regulation of alcoholic beverages. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
307. See Zick, supra note 15.
308. Id. at 1195-96.
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constitutional, thousands of internet users would be deterred from expressing
Such a suppression of speech is even more
themselves on the Internet.'
undeserved considering that COPA would likely be ineffective in protecting
children from indecent websites when children will still have access to all the
sites that originate from outside the U.S.3' ° In addition, many of the large,
commercial, adult websites are likely to move to a server outside of the U.S.
rather than removing or toning down "teasers" which are often highly effective
in increasing traffic to their sites."' Considering that blocking programs,
which can block out foreign websites, exist and do not create the problems of
infringing on the rights of adults' freedom of speech, laws like COPA will not
likely be found to be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the goal of
protecting children12and thus will not pass the strict scrutiny required by the
First Amendment.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
In order to survive strict scrutiny, laws like COPA must be both effective
and the least restrictive means among other effective alternatives.3 ' 3 Yet,
several alternative means are available which would restrict minors' access to
adult material deemed harmful to them while not restricting adult First
Amendment rights. 314 Future laws that support or complement, rather than
compete with, these alternative means should be preferred. Means of
restricting children's access to adult materials can be divided into two
categories: filtering and zoning.3" 5 Laws like the CDA and COPA were
themselves a type of zoning solution to the problem of restricting children's
access to adult sites,3" 6 but alternative zoning techniques also exist and, along
with filtering solutions, will be explored in this Part. Filtering has been an
alternative pursued since the failure of the CDA to pass constitutional muster
in Reno L37 Filtering involves blocking adult sites.3"' Zoning focuses on
segregation of adult sites from general-access sites.3t 9 This comment will now

309. See Reno 1,521 U.S. at 872.
310. See Reno 11, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
311.

312.
313.

314.

See id at 476.

See Zick, supra note 15 at 1191-93.
id. at 1192.

See id. at 1160-62.

AWRENCE LESS1G, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 175-76 (1999).
315.
316. Id. at 176-77.
317. James V. Dobeus, Rating Internet Content and the Spectre of Government
Regulation, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 625, 626-27 (1998).
318. LmsIG.,supra note 315, at 176.

319.

Id at 175.
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review both methods in turn, including the strengths and weaknesses of each
as alternatives to laws like COPA.
A. FILTERING

Filtering is generally considered a way for web surfers to block sites or
pages on the Web which they find objectionable, either personally or to their
children.3' 2 Filtering can be used by individuals, Internet providers, or
jurisdictions.3 21 Filtering can be accomplished through the use of either
hardware or software. 3" Due to the much greater ease of software blocking
over hardware blocking, most people interested in filtering websites opt for
software.3"
Blocking software can either work solely within its own
programmed parameters, or work in conjunction with content ratings."
Software that relies solely on the parameters set forth by the user or software
manufacturer is called "stand alone blocking software." 3" A common type of
blocking software that works in conjunction with outside content ratings is that
found on all the latest versions of the Internet Explorer and Netscape web
browsers.326

1. Stand Alone Blocking Software
Stand alone blocking software does not use outside ratings but only the
parameters for blocking set forth by the software manufacturer, the software
user, or both.327 Filtering software can work by using either a "fixed" or
"heuristic" system."2 Software using a fixed system can block entire hosts or
specific pages on a given host.33 These hosts or pages are blocked using a
fixed list of known objectionable web addresses. 33* The software will block
these sites or pages unless proper authorization, like a password, is supplied

320.
321.

322.

Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 178.

Christopher T. Furlow, ErogenousZoning on the Cyber-Frontier,5 VA. J. L. &

TEcH. 7,17 (2000), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/v5i2a7-Furlow.html (last visited Mar.
19, 2001).

323. Id. at I 7-8.
324. Dobeus, supranote 317, at 632-33.
325. Id.
326.

About ICRA, at http:llwww.icra.orglabout.htmi (last visited Jan. 5, 2001). ICRA

discussed infra Part VI.A.2.
327. Dobeus, supranote 317, at 632-33.
328. Furlow, supra note 322, at 18.
329. d at19.
330. Id. The web address for a particular site is also referred to as "Universal Resource
Locator" ("URL").
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to remove the block.33' Due to the fact that the Intemet is constantly growing
and changing, blocking software which uses fixed lists often encounters two
related problems: 1)being labor-intensive to the administrator of the list; and
2) failing to block newly formed or mirrored objectionable sites.332
Other types of blocking software exist which do not rely on constantly
updated lists.333 These programs filter heuristically by searching requested
URLs for potentially objectionable material, and making educated guesses
about whether the page would in fact be objectionable.3 ' They deny access
to the site if the program determines a high probability of objectionable
content.335 The educated guesses about the content of. the site are based on
keywords and metatag information on the site.3' 4 This type of information
garnished from the site is not always an accurate proxy for the content of the
site. 337 As such, heuristic blocking software will sometimes make inaccurate
guesses about a site and either block a site with useful and non-threatening
information, or not block a site with objectionable information. 33s
Filtering programs also allow more parental control over the content that
their children see because many such programs allow the parent to choose
which adult sites they want to block out while allowing other types of adult
sites to be viewed.33 ' In addition to sexually explicit sites, blocking programs
can also filter out other sites that parents find questionable, such as hate sites
and drug-related sitesY3 Also, unlike COPA, blocking software will limit the
access of children to non-commercial sites without running into the First
Amendment difficulties found in the CDA.3"

331.

332.
333.
334.
335.

1d.
14 at 10. A "mirror"

Id.at lI1.
Id.
Id

is a duplicate of another site at a different web address.

336. Id. A "metatag" is a special HTML instruction embedded in the HTML code which
provides web browsers with information about the web page, including information about what
the page contains. Search engines often use these metatags in cataloging web pages. LEwEY,
supra note 81, at 1095.
337. Furlow, supra note 322, ai 11.
338. Doherty, supra note 15, at 297. "Surfwatch software prevented the University of
Kansas Medical Center from accessing their own 'Archie R. Dykes Medical Library [sic]."'
Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HAsTINGS COMM. &ENT. L. J. 453, 460 (1997), quoted
in Doherty, supra note 15, at 297 n.281.
339. Doherty, supra note 15, at 295-96. Cyber Patrol uses fifteen categories including
"violence/profanity" and "sexual acts" and assigns a label of "CyberNOT" or "CyberYES"
within each category. CYBERsitter, on the other hand, blocks only a single set of questionable
sites with no opportunity to block only a part of any list. Id.
340. Zick, supra note 15, at 1162.
341. Id. at 1193.
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This kind of software runs into other difficulties when it rejects coded
"dirty" words which appear in the text of a document. 2" For example,
"Scunthorpe, England" may be blocked because of the word "cunt" embedded
within the city name. 3 As filtering programs continue to improve, problems
Another problem with
such as these are likely to start disappearing.'
blocking programs that use keywords is that they are not going to be able to
filter out sexually explicit pictures unaccompanied by text.3 4 5 Despite the
problems with the blocking software, evidence suggests that it is a reasonably
effective method of assisting parents' attempts to restrict their children's
access to adult sites.'
2. Content Ratings
Blocking software can also be used in conjunction with outside ratings. 347
Assuming the sites were rated accurately, the blocking software would be able
to block sites much more effectively since fixed lists would not need to be
maintained and updated, and because decisions to block would be based on a
predetermined rating rather than keywords and metatag information.
Currently, the foundation for such a rating system appears to be a technology
called "Platform for Internet Content Selection" (PICS).3 8 PICS is not a rating
system, but rather a set of protocols which would allow webmasters or
34 9
independent third parties to rate a site.
PICS is the system currently used by the Internet Content Rating
The ICRA is an independent, international
Association (ICRA).35
organization which offers ratings, using the PICS standard, to webmasters who
complete ICRA's online questionnaire about the content of their sites.3" The
ICRA system can currently be used with the blocking software that comes
standard in both Internet Explorer and Netscape Browsers. 3 2 The ICRA
questionnaire covers the topics of language, nudity and sexual content,
violence, and a miscellaneous category. covering gambling, drugs, and

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Doherty, supra note 15, at 297.
Weinberg, supra note 338, at 460, quotedin Doherty, supra note 15, at 297 n.281.
Doherty, supra note 15, at 297.
Zick, supranote 15, at 1162.
Reno 1,521 U.S. at 877.
Dobeus, supranote 317, at 633.
Id. at 627.
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351. Id. The ICRA's forerunner was the Recreational Software Advisory Council on the
internet (RSACi), but they turned control of internet rating over to ICRA in April of 1999.
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alcohol.353 Within each of these broad topics, the webmaster is asked
questions about whether a specific item is present on his site.354 The
questionnaire also asks if the material featured on the site is suitable for young
children because it is intended to be artistic, educational, or medical in
nature. 355 The ICRA system is not without controversy though. Specifically,
many people disagree with the PICS ratings. 356 Indeed, any ratings standard

is bound to be skewed 7by the personal, cultural, religious, and moral values of
those who created it.31

If legislation is passed which requires such ratings, 358 and the webmaster
disagrees with the rating system used, First Amendment issues may be raised
as well.35 9 Can a webmaster be forced to associate with a ratings system with
which she does not agree? In his article in the John Marshall Journal of
Computer and Information Law, James V. Dobeus argues that webmasters
could not be forced to do so under the First Amendment. 3' He cites a series
of cases dealing with a First Amendment right not to speak or associate with
speech.3" Mandatory rating laws may force webmasters to use a rating system
with which they fundamentally disagree.3 '2 The government would, in effect,
be requiring webmasters to use speech, in the form of ratings, which they
otherwise would not make if not under threat of liability. 363 The webmaster's

only other real option in such a circumstance would be to refrain from any
speech at all on his website. 3 " Additionally, making ratings mandatory may

353.

Id.

360.

See id.

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id
Id.
Dobeus, supra note 317, at 628-29.
See id at 646.
Such legislation has been proposed before. See id. at 629 n. 18.
See id at 650-53.

361. Id The First Amendment not only guarantees a right to speak, but also a right not
to speak (Citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985)). The Supreme Court has held that the government cannot force a person to speak where
the person would otherwise remain silent (Citing Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind, Inc., 487
U.S. 781 (1988)). The Supreme Court has also held that compelling the disclosure of names
and address of election materials was unconstitutional even though the disclosures were factual
and assisted voters (Citing McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995)). The
government cannot force someone to advocate an ideological point that the person finds
unacceptable (Citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). The Court has also ruled that
a speaker has a right not to be forced to associate with statements the speaker would rather
avoid (Citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,573-74
(1995)).
362. Dobeus, supra note 317, at 650.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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force some webmasters to associate the ratings with their internet speech.365
Based on prior Supreme Court precedent, Dobeus argues, these facts would
make such a mandatory ratings law unconstitutional. 3
Assuming websites are rated, either on a mandatory or voluntary basis,
the ratings will most likely appear in one of two possible forms: tagging or
restricted top-level domains (rTLD).367 An example of tagging legislation
would be a requirement that all web publishers provide a label imbedded
within either the HTML code or the web address of the site to include words
like "xxx" or "adult." " A label within the HTML code would presumably be
included in the metatag. A web address label, on the other hand, may read as
follows: "www.site.com/adult/content.hml" where "adult" would denote that
the site contains adult material. Webmasters would thus be required to review
their webpages before they published them on the Web and determine whether
Blocking software would then become
adult material appears on them.'
much more effective in filtering out adult sites because rather than searching
for keywords, it could simply search for the adult label in the metatag or web
address."
The current keyword search utilized by several blocking programs is less
accurate. 37 ' For example, a keyword filter may block a site about a recipe for
chicken because it contains the word "breast." This sort of self-labeling of
one's website would be similar to the current "Parental Advisory" stickers
placed on music albums by record companies. Unlike albums, which
primarily deal with explicit language, a useful internet tagging system would,
of course, contain more categories than just "adult" and "child-suitable." An
alternative to self-labeling sites would be a requirement to register one's
websites with a third party.3 1 The third party then would make an
independent determination of the tag to be placed in the HTML code or web
Different ratings could then be administered by different
address."3
organizations. 3 ' This sort of labeling is similar to the MPAA rating system
of motion pictures.

365. Id. at 652.
366. See id. at 650-54.
367. See Zick, supra note 15, at 1160-61; see also Furlow, supra note 322, at 14.
368. Zick, supra note 15, at 1161.

369. Id.
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Restricted top-level Domains (rTLD)3" would also include labels such as

"xxx" or "adult," but would be incorporated into the top-level domain name. 376
The web address would thus look something like this: "www.site.adult" where
the familiar ".com"' would be replaced with ".adult."' 3" Restricted top-level
domains "would require that judgments be made concerning whether the
content of a site requires that it be located within the new domain and would
further require that software be developed to block sites based upon the new
domain names."' 7 A possible advantage to rTLD over tagging would be that
it could be implemented by ICANN.Y" Whether ICANN will be able to
enforce webmaster compliance with TLD is another matter altogether. 8 One
possible ICANN enforcement mechanism could be the revocation of the
domain names for failing to comply with the zoning requirements.38 '
B. ZONING

Both the CDA and COPA attempted to zone the Internet through threat
of criminal prosecution. 32 Two basic types of internet zoning are available,
both of which attempt to certify a web surfer's age.383 One type tries to certify
that the web surfer is an adult, "adult certification," and the other type tries 3to
certify that the surfer is under eighteen years of age, "child certification.9 84
Both the CDA and COPA focused on adult certification. 35 Adult certification
denies access to everyone except those who certify themselves as adults.'"
Child certification, on the other hand, would grant access to the site to
everyone except those that certify themselves as children. 7 Adult
certification would place more of a burden on both web surfers and
webmasters, but it would also provide greater protection to children.'"
375.

Furlow, supranote 322, at 4. The rTLD type of rating is also referred to as "DNS
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Id Child certification would rely on age-verification technology such as digital
Id Child certification would be less of a burden on adult web surfers because they

would not have to set up a digital certificate for themselves since the default decision is to allow
entry. Child certification would be less of a burden on webmasters because they would only
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COPA's affirmative defense section sets out the various means of adult
certification, including the use of credit cards, debit accounts, adult access
codes, adult personal identification numbers, and digital certificates.3 ' As
discussed earlier, credit and debit cards present a problem in that some minors
may have access to them, and some adults may not. Age verification must be
more precise in order for zoning to work.
Adult passwords are more precise than credit or debit cards, but they
present a different problem. Age verification based on passwords could make
surfing from one adult site to another difficult if password entry was always
required. 390 A solution to this dilemma would be the use of a "cookie." A
cookie in cyberspace refers not to a sweet, home-baked treat, but rather to a
program placed in a "cookie file" on a surfer's hard drive by the site being
visited. After the site places the cookie, the site will be able to receive various
information about the surfer.39' The advantage of cookies is that they offer
seamless verification.392 In other words, unless the surfer sets the web browser
to notify him of cookie exchanges, he can browse the Web with little or no
interruption.393 The disadvantage of cookies is that some surfers view them as
an invasion of privacy, since they can be used to gain all sorts of information
about the surfer other than age. 3"
Digital certificates, on the other hand, would provide the security of
passwords and the convenience of cookies.39 A digital certificate would
reside on the web surfer's hard drive, and would provide information about the
surfer, including the surfer's age.3'6 When the surfer entered the site, the site
would automatically check the certified information. 397 The surfer could
release only the information she wanted to only those she wanted. Parents
concerned about what their children view on the Web could require that their
children use a digital certificate which indicated the child's birth date:
be liable for allowing entry of a surfer who had certified that he was a minor. Adult
certification would provide greater protection in the sense that a child could not circumvent a
parent's wish to restrict access to adult sites by using a computer outside the home that did not
contain a digital certificate.
389. COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 23 1(c).
390.

LESSIG, supranote 315, at 34.

391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id
394. Id. at 41-42. Enabling the cookie notifier is a defense against this invasion of
privacy, but most surfers find the constant alerts of cookie exchanges too annoying to tolerate.
Id.

395. Id. at 35. Digital certificates would rely on encryption technology in order to make
them secure.
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397. Id
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Computers could be set up to have a different digital certificate for each user
of the home computer. Access to the Internet could be denied on the computer
unless a digital certificate was activated first. The child would only have the
password to activate the digital certificate with his or her information on it.
Adult websites could be set up so as to allow entry only to those surfers who
have a digital certification of adult status. Additionally, unlike zoning based
on adult passwords or credit cards, digital certificates could differentiate
between older and younger children's ages. A webmaster may thus compose
a site which she feels is suitable for teenagers, but not for children under the
age of thirteen. She may then deny access to younger children and allow
access to teenagers.
Although much of the current focus is on filtering, noted cyberlaw
scholar, Lawrence Lessig, contends that digital certificate zoning is a better
alternative to filtering in that it is more accurate than stand alone blocking
software and that it avoids the "upstream invisibility" problems of blocking
software used in conjunction with content ratings. 3" The problems of content
ratings, Lessig argues, spring from the neutrality of the PICS format. 3" Lessig
warns that the filtering is not only "horizontally neutral," allowing the
individual surfer to choose which types of sites to block, but also "vertically
40
neutral," allowing the filtration to occur at any level of the distribution.
Although most think of filtration occurring on the surfer's computer, Lessig
points out that filtration can occur further up in the distribution chain."' This
"upstream filtering" can occur at the organization through which the surfer
gains intemet access, at the surfer's ISP, or even at the jurisdiction in which
the surfer resides.' Since filtration at a point' further upstream than the
surfer's computer could be completely invisible to the user, filtration could be
done without the surfer even being aware of it. 3
With digital certificate zoning, however, the individual would know when
Thus, any unjustified exclusion could be
she was being denied access.'
challenged by the person being blocked. 5 Digital certificate zoning would
allow individuals to choose their own filters rather than potentially having the
filters chosen for them." Yet, in order for digital certificate zoning to work,
398.
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the adult sites must have verification technology so that they can check the
digital certificate.' Such verification technology is still costly, and if digital
certification of age is required, smaller, non-commercial, adult webmasters
The cost of digital
might not be able to comply with this requirement'
expressed by the
concerns
to
the
similar
certificate verification technology is
Reno I Court about the costs of credit card verification technology stifling the
speech of non-commercial, adult webmasters.'" A digital certificate zoning
law could limit itself to commercial websites, but lawmakers should be careful
to give a narrower definition than that of "engaged in the business" found in
COPA."0 COPA's definition would have included many smaller web
publishers whose speech would have been stifled because of the financial
burden placed upon them."'
C. FINDING THE APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE

Problems exist with both filtering and zoning solutions. Stand alone
blocking software is a powerful tool which avoids all the First Amendment
concerns faced by government legislation. Nonetheless, current technology
which uses fixed lists or heuristic search methods will not be completely
effective in blocking out harmful materials." 2 Blocking software used in

conjunction with content ratings avoids the problems associated with fixed
lists and heuristic search methods, but it remains inadequate since most sites

on the net are still not rated for content. If a website is not rated, then PICS
compatible software will block it as "unrated.'"' 3 Thus, many useful and nonthreatening sites will be filtered. A federal law requiring mandatory content
ratings will make this software more effective, but such a law may also violate
First Amendment rights of webmasters."4' Even if constitutional, we must

consider whether we would even want a filtering system that used ratings and

blocking software. The possibility of overfiltration and censorship becomes
more likely with a PICS rating system."'

407. Furlow, supra note 322, at 150.
408. Id.
409. See Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 856.
410. See COPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(2XA).
411. See Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493-95.
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harmful material effectively if all unrated sites are blocked as well. Weinberg, supra note 338,
at 471-72, cited in Doherty, supra note 15, at 297 n.126.
414.
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Zoning solutions provide an alternative to filtration. Adult certification
zoning by threat of criminal prosecution is not the answer under current
technology as the Reno cases made clear."" Legislation that promotes the
development of inexpensive and effective age-verification technology seems
more appropriate. At present, digital certification zoning appears to be the best
long term solution to the problem of children's access to harmful material on
the Web. Yet, enforcement of a digital certificate zoning method must wait
until verification technology becomes affordable and simple enough for all
webmasters to use. At that time, a law requiring webmasters to utilize such
verification technology will not encounter the problems of stifling the speech
of smaller, non-commercial webmasters. Such inexpensive digital certificate
verification technology does not currently exist however. Until such time as
it does, stand alone blocking software is the best short term remedy to the

problem of denying children access to adult material on the Web, while
preserving the First Amendment rights of adults.
VII. CONCLUSION

In the Reno I case, the Supreme Court dealt with the freedom of speech
as it relates to the restriction of adult material on the Internet for the first time.
Like the technology that guides the Internet, the laws that seek to regulate it
are in their infancy. While use of the Internet as a means of communication
is growing at an incredible rate, it still remains a novel and often
misunderstood medium by many. Early attempts by states to restrict minors
access to the Internet have run into Commerce Clause problems." 7 As a result,
future legislation will likely come in the form of federal statutes. Any attempt
to "conquer" the wilds of the new information superhighway in haste, without
allowing for technological development, will likely result in the undue
subjugation of adults' First Amendment rights.4 t ' While making the Internet
safe for children is an important concern, that safety cannot come at the
expense of adults' freedoms. The Internet has the potential to open up a whole
new world of free expression which will allow people to communicate new
ideas to a group as diverse and numerous as anything known before in the
history of humankind, but not, however, if the reins on this new technology are
pulled in too tightly, too quickly.
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Much of the uncertainly that remains in this area of law will be cast aside
as computer technology and Internet case precedent continues to develop. For
the time being however, cases like Reno, Cyberspace, and Johnson suggest
that laws like COPA will be tough to defend against the strict scrutiny of First
Amendment review, especially when less restrictive alternatives like blocking
software exist and continue to improve. Under the current state of internet
law, perhaps Congress would be better served by showing restraint when it
comes to criminal statutes regulating indecent material on the Web and instead
focusing on encouraging advances in blocking software and age verification.
Until such time as age-verification technology improves and becomes
affordable to all webmasters, stand alone blocking software is the best way of
achieving the government's objective of protecting minors from indecency on
the Web while preserving adults' rights. When age-verification technology
does become widely available and affordable, digital certification zoning may
then become the long-term solution.
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